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From the Virtues of Argumentation to the Happiness of Dispute

Bruno Mastroianni
University of Florence, Italy - ORCID: 0000-0002-5071-762X


ABOUT THIS CHAPTER

Efficient debate training should develop the ability to manage real discussions and not just be a laboratory for ideal talks. In this regard, the perspective of the virtues of argumentation is particularly suitable. Virtuous arguing allows the recognition of the other's difference – the contemplation of difference. Using Aristotelian ideas of contemplation as happiness opens up the possibility of accepting the arguers' imperfections and configure disputes suitable for producing shared outcomes, making them genuinely deliberative.
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Keywords: Argumentation Theory, Virtue Argumentation Theory, Delibertive debate

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Pages: 25-41

Published by: Firenze University Press

Publication year: 2021

DOI: 10.36253/978-88-5518-329-1.04

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© 2021 Author(s)
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Publication year: 2021

DOI: 10.36253/978-88-5518-329-1.04

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© 2021 Author(s)
Content licence CC BY 4.0
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References

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Mastroianni, B.; 2021; From the Virtues of Argumentation to the Happiness of Dispute. Firenze, Firenze University Press.


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