Tracking Venice’s Maritime Traffic in the First Age of Globalization: A Geospatial Analysis

ponctuellement, en ordonnant l’armement d’une galère communale, pour poursuivre des pirates qui s’étaient pris aux navires ragusains : mais il est à noter que ces expéditions punitives se limitaient aux eaux proches de Raguse, généralement au plus loin, jusqu’aux côtes albanaises ou celle des Pouilles, sur la côte opposée de l’Adriatique. La menace de poursuivre les coupables d’une attaque contre un navire ragusain près de Sicile « usque ad columnas »50, était proférée pour montrer une certaine détermination et une suite dans les idées plutôt qu’autre chose, et ne s’est probablement jamais matérialisée. Il y avait aussi les moyens diplomatiques plus feutrés, à l’égard des puissances protectrices des corsaires, tel le roi d’Aragon, dont les corsaires étaient souvent sujets, et que les Ragusains voulaient impliquer dans la protection de leur réseau maritime : ces missions diplomatiques régulièrement envoyées en Sicile, en Catalogne, ou vers les Pouilles, étaient plus efficaces que les menaces militaires. Il y avait aussi l’arme des représailles contre les ressortissants locaux, dont les compatriotes avaient attaqué les Ragusains en haute mer. Il s’agissait de marchands catalans, qui étaient souvent convoqués par le gouvernement ragusain afin de s’expliquer, mais celui-ci procédait rarement aux représailles directes, car celles-ci étaient contreproductives et nuisaient au commerce. Il est donc légitime de conclure, que Raguse a construit au fil des deux derniers siècles du Moyen Age, un puissant réseau maritime, qui s’étendait aussi bien au Levant qu’au Ponant. Ce réseau, bien qu’issu du réseau vénitien, a pu faire valoir au fil du temps, ses traits particuliers, qui le distinguaient du réseau vénitien, et correspondaient surtout à la vocation de Raguse qui était celle d’une plaque tournante, entre les routes terrestres de son arrière-pays, et le grand large, drainant les métaux précieux et d’autres produits de l’intérieur des Balkans, vers les marchés du grand espace méditerranéen, jusqu’à ses limites orientales et occidentales, et satisfaisant les divers besoins, bien au-delà de cette modeste commune adriatique. Cette tendance va faire de la flotte marchande de Raguse, comme l’a justement constaté Fernand Braudel, l’une des plus efficientes dans l’espace méditerranéen du premier âge moderne.


INTRODUCTION
The lifeline of international trade is provided by shipping -a sector that is considered by scholars as one of the four cornerstones that fostered globalization. Today, shipping lines are said to operate in a borderless environment where economic priorities are dominant. In this sense, transport geography has largely surpassed political geography and geopolitics. However, until the mid-twentieth century, the prospects of shipping were tied down to the level of economic activity of the place of registry; thus, the interplay between political change, fleet nationality and the evolution of shipping networks was crucial.
The present collaborative work in progress is an empirical attempt to verify this interplay with regard to the decline of Venice as a provider of shipping services to large parts of the Mediterranean and Atlantic world in the late fifteenth and the early sixteenth century. While a general trend of decline is outlined in many scholarly works, the complexity of the subject and its particularities are largely ignored. 1 The yearly fluctuations in the volume and value of trade moving by sea are assessed only in relation to the auctioning of merchant galleys. Information on the movement of dozens of other round ships and hundreds of smaller vessels is so fragmented that, as yet, no scholar has put forward a comprehensive analysis of the fluctuations in Venice's marine traffic over time. For this reason the picture received, although significant and on the whole correct, oversimplifies the continuous interplay between Venice's geopolitics, the evolution of shipping networks and trading volumes.
On the basis of historical data on ship positions, extracted from archival sources, we create GIS-based online maps in order to conduct a geospatial analysis of the annual traffic intensity and movement patterns along regional and interregional sea routes linking the Venetian port system with Mediterranean ports. In this sense, the platform "simulates" modern real-time technologies used to visualize shipping trends per vessel types. 2 Our aim is to examine to what extent shipping within the Venetian maritime state remained a closed system. To do so, we address the following questions: How did political and economic factors, such as the oceanic discoveries, Ottoman expansion, piracy, and so on, affect the colonial-Venetian maritime network? How did ship-owners of different socioeconomic backgrounds and geographical origins negotiate their position within this maritime network? Related to these questions are the particular privileged-based legal status of a colonial ship, entangling empires and multiple identities, the practice of "flagging out", and illegal traffic. 3 The project aspires also to contribute to a discussion of larger issues related to the longterm effects of Venetian rule in its overseas territories on economic development, migration, cultural and ethnic identity in these possessions.

METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
Spatial history is not a new field. In 1949 Fernand Braudel placed scale and spatial relations at the forefront of his magisterial study, which remains one of the discipline's most influential works. Since Braudel's analysis of communication lags, 4 many historians have used the power of maps as presentation media to make spatial arguments. Recently, historians have been using GIS-based tools to detect sometimes invisible connections and to investigate how spatial relations stimulated cultural, social and political change, and how changes in technology, economy and policy created new spatial interrelations. 5 In this context, density 2 An interactive version of the trajectory maps (maps. 1-4) is available on the project's website. Clicking on each one of the trajectories opens a text box with information on the vessel's itinerary and the corresponding bibliographical note: https://sites.google.com/view/venetian-shipping (accessed 15th December 2018).
3 Venetian citizenship and belonging were handled and negotiated differently in different Venetian dominions. Cf maps and trajectory compilations are a highly effective means of showing vessel movement patterns. One such example is the data visualization of oceanic shipping routes of the fleets of Britain, France, Spain and The Netherlands, based on paths recorded in logbooks of ships sailing between 1750 and 1800. 6 Unfortunately, very few logbooks in connection with Venetian shipping in the sixteenth century have survived. 7 As far as Venice is concerned, information on galleys is relatively abundant and serial in nature, whereas that on the navigations of round ships is scarce, barely known and certainly not serial. Thus, any attempt to reconstruct historical maritime traffic has to start with the collecting of numerous fragmented pieces of evidence scattered across different sources and archives. The present project is distinguished by its adoption of a bottom-up approach that is strengthened by both narratives and visualizations.
In this paper, we present two trajectory maps, each one representing Venice's maritime traffic in the course of one calendar year. The first map covers the year 1497, and the second map shows Venice's maritime flows for 1514. The timeframe covers major geographical discoveries, Ottoman expansion, the struggle for hegemony in Europe, and the increased presence of other European powers in the Mediterranean. By comparing both maps, we are able to explore behaviour patterns and geographical coverage, as well as changing trends and anomalies in the shipping market over time. This information is complemented by an analysis of the maritime connections with the port of Candia, and the behaviour patterns of the Corfiot fleet in the year 1514.
Due to the piecemeal nature of the available sources, we had to make several informed guesses regarding the vessel's identity and itinerary. There is no certainty, for example, that a vessel captained by a Venetian-Cretan subject was Cretan. Likewise, the complete itinerary is generally missing, and the trajectory lines visuali-6 Mapped. British, Spanish and Dutch Shipping 1750-1800: http://spatial.ly/2012/03/mappedbritish-shipping-1750-1800/ (Accessed 15 July 2018). On the basis of the same logbooks, a different visualization represents one hundred years of ship paths. It also allows the detection of seasonal patterns, as well as anomalies caused by the American Revolution or the Napoleonic Wars: http://sappingattention.blogspot.com/2012/04/visualizing-ocean-shipping.html (Accessed 15 July 2018). Ibid., paths taken by American ships from about 1800 to 1860; the German merchant marine in the late nineteenth century, etc. 7 In this respect, the diaries of pilgrims and other travellers who embarked on Venetian vessels to and from the Levant are a valuable source of information. For a systematic analysis of the itineraries: R. GLUZMAN In the early months of 1497, large parts of northern Italy suffered the effects of famine and the main sources of grain were Sicily, the Ottoman Empire and, to a lesser extent, Alexandria. In order to supply Venice with grain, the Republic signed contracts with ships' captains and merchants. A deal mediated by Andrea Gritti, then resident in Constantinople, secured the shipment of 20,000 stara of wheat from Ottoman territories, on vessels that were licensed at his end. 8 The French invasion of Italy and the onset of the Italian Wars (1494-1499), in which Venice became actively involved in March 1495, had intensified hostilities. In a parallel war against Florence, the Republic supported Pisa (1496-1499). 9 The resultant financial burden depleted the public funds of the Monte Nuovo, which exceeded 1.6 million ducats. This was matched by the Senate's all-too-frequent recourse to the decime (this tithe was applied no fewer than seventy times between 1482 and 1499). 10 Sure enough, the alarming rise in plunder and confiscation at sea and on land caused uncertainty in the markets. Seaborne trade in the Western Mediterranean was particularly hard hit. At least 15 grain-carrying vessels on the route from Sicily to Genoa were captured by the French. 11 Nine vessels laden with sugar from Madeira were attacked by French corsairs in the Ionian Sea; the majority escaped and sought shelter in Venice, Lesina (modern Hvar) and other ports. 12 Much of Venice's war effort was concentrated in the Tyrrhenian Sea, between March and April 1497. 13 In June of the same year, whilst Venice was contending with the marauding French fleet, a territorial dispute between the Serenissima and the Ottoman Empire over Cattaro (modern Kotor) almost escalated to an armed conflict. In response, a squadron of Venetian light galleys commanded by Domenico Malipiero was ordered to leave Genoa immediately and sail directly to Cattaro, where it was deployed in patrol missions to protect the returning grain caravans, as well as Venetian possessions in Albania. 14 Equally worrying were the raids in the Aegean Sea against small and medium-sized vessels, carried out by the notorious Ottoman privateer Admiral Kemal Reis and his fleet of two galleys, six fuste, a barza of 300 botti and several caravels. 15 However, the Republic was particularly concerned about recent developments in La Rocella (modern Rocella Ionica) in the Sea of Calabria. Conveniently located on the route by which Sicilian grain reached Venice, the town was turned into a pirate haven for the notorious Spaniard corsair Piero Navaro. In the months of July and August, Venice's merchant marine lost 11 vessels in that area alone. The capture of a maran owned by Andrea Loredan q. Nicolò and a navilio of 250 botti captained by Zuane Fachin, carrying 6,000 ducats in cash and belonging to the same illfated merchant, had caused quite a commotion in the Senate. 16 Violence and lawlessness on the high seas were on the rise, and to secure the main shipping routes three warships (the so-called barze di Comun) were commissioned to escort the convoys of galleys and ships to the Levant, and to conduct patrol missions around Sicily. The barza commanded by Andrea Loredan q. Francesco (not to be confused with the ill-fated merchant) sailed to Sicily, while the warship Pasqualiga escorted the muda of galleys from Syria and Alexandria before it turned 11 M. SANUTO, I diarii, cit., I, col. 626-627. 12 Ibid., col. 640. 13 Despite truce, war fleets attacked merchantmen. Venetian galleys were employed in the Ligurian Sea, which was teaming with Genoese and Spanish fleets: ARCHIVIO 18 Earlier, in July, the barza Loredana seized two vessels belonging to a corsair named Antonio de Marcho, off Cape Spartivento in Calabria; the captured vessels were sent to Syracuse. Meanwhile, the ascending galleys from the Barbary Coast fought with Navaro's galion and two fuste in La Rocella. Only when the barza Loredana launched a land assault on Navaro's men and terrorized the local population was order restored. 19 Still in the month of August, part of the fleet of war galleys awaiting decommission was sent instead to the southern Aegean Sea, to secure the convoys returning from the Levant. 20 The lasting impact of these operations on the activity of the Venetian trading companies is amply attested by Andrea Loredan q. Nicolò's petition to the Provveditori alle biave (the magistracy regulating the import, storage and distribution of wheat, as well as other cereals and legumes). The merchant had undertaken to supply 40,000 stara of grain from Sicily and Negroponte. For this purpose, he leased many vessels, which he loaded with metals, including gold, and spices. Most of these ships were either captured, being easy prey for the powerful corsair Piero Navaro, or detained in various ports for months on end. Consequently, Loredan failed to fulfil his various obligations to the Serenissima. 20 Ibid, p. 703. 21 A document approved by the Collegio alle biave attests 10 vessels that were licensed by Andrea Loredan to transport 30 stara of wheat from Sicily and 10,000 stara of wheat from Negroponte. It is assumed that at least two-thirds of these vessels sailed to Sicily: 1. Nicolò Buso di Maran -licensed 24 July to transport 3,200 stara wheat / captured on the outward voyage.
3. Antonio di Michiel -licensed 24 July to transport 1,600 stara wheat / captured on the outward voyage.
As our map (Map. 1) shows, despite efforts to secure shipping, there were quite a few incidents in which gripi and caravelle owned by subjects of Venice were captured in the areas of Sicily, Calabria, Saseno (Albania), the Peloponnese and the Ionian and Aegean seas. Larger vessels were not immune from violent attacks either: the pilgrim galley captained by Alvise Zorzi fought with corsairs in the vicinity of Crete on its return voyage from Jaffa. 22 23 Despite the intensification of hostility, traffic between Venice and Sicily was lively. 24 There was also a steady presence of Venetian round ships in the Tyrrhenian Sea; some were employed as grain carriers from Sicily to Pisa. The North African Coast was frequented by round ships of 600 to 800 botti, flying the San Marco flag; our sources indicate at least four such ships, of which one was licensed by Moorish 6. Felippo Brochetta de Francesco -licensed 27 July to transport 5,500 stara wheat / consigned 13 December 5,259 stara.
9. Zuane Barbota -licensed 21 September to transport 1,200 stara / not consigned. 10. Isepo de Zuane -licensed 21 September to transport 3,200 stara / not consigned. Another document attest however for the successful consignments of all vessels that were licensed by Stefano and Teodosio Contarini and Carlo Contarini q. Battista to transport 20,000 stara of wheat from Sicily or Negroponte: 11. Michiel di Stefano -licensed 14 August to transport 3,500 stara wheat / consigned 3,032 stara 18 December.
16 Apart from merchandise, ships were also transporting money. The silver coinage minted in Europe and sent to Egypt alone amounted to as much as 300,000 ducats. In spring, a galley bound for Alexandria carried well over 12 metric tonnes of silver coinage, although some of it returned to Venice. 29 The galleys and round ships heading for Syria carried 70,000 and 50,000 ducats respectively. The autumn muda to Alexandria was crowned with success and the returning convoy carried 4,320 colli of spices and additional 80 colli on a licensed ship (nave a rata). The galleys to Beirut returned with less, due to elevated freight rates in Syria (2,639 colli of spices and 220 colli of silk). 30 However, the late return of this muda also saw one of the biggest catastrophes of the decade, the wreck of two galleys at the entrance of Porto Cigala (modern Čikat), in stormy conditions in November. The salvage attempts explain the anomaly we see on the map (Map. 1). Another insight is related to the traffic of round ships to the Levant: due to the aforementioned plague in Syria, the autumn muda of ships sailed only as far as Cyprus. Several other trends for the year 1497 are noted: the lines between Venice, Crete and Constantinople were maintained mainly by gripi and other small and medium-sized vessels. So far, we have found only one indication of a Venetian round ship that sailed in this direction. On the Atlantic front, two large ships, the Foscara of 3,000 botti and the Pasqualiga of 800 botti, completed a voyage to England, even though earlier that year the ship Tiepola (or Foscara) was attacked by a French fleet and wrecked in the Bay of Biscay. 32 Three other round ships were wrecked that year. 33

TRENDS IN VENICE'S MARITIME TRAFFIC FOR 1514
The early decades of the sixteenth century mark the transition from the coexistence of state-organized and private maritime transport to the domination of the latter. Only two galleys to Beirut were operating in 1514. The gradual abandonment of the convoys of galleys gave ship-owners from Venice's colonies and vessels flying other flags the opportunity to take into their own hands a greater share of the freights that had hitherto been transported predominantly by the Serenissima's galleys. 34 The events that led to the outbreak of the War of the League of Cambrai (1509-1516) and those that followed are well known, and there is no need to repeat them here. Instead, we have chosen to highlight several changing trends in shipping.
The loss of territories in the terraferma meant that Venice could no longer import grain from the Padovan and Polesine areas, and the crops in Cyprus provided an alternative source. In fact, they were exploited for that purpose, and Venice's easternmost island nourished the population of Crete as well. A new provision instructed ships bound for Syria to call in at Cyprus on the outward leg, and to load wheat and barley on the return voyage. In a letter to the Council of Ten (14 March), the Governor of Nicosia guaranteed to provide enough grain to fill twelve round ships. 35 The trajectory map for 1514 (Map. 2) suggests that the line Venice-Cyprus was exploited by round ships and medium-sized vessels chartered at both ends for that purpose. 36 Several ships managed to complete two round voyages to Cyprus in 32 Nave Tiepola (or Foscara) of Hieronimo Tiepolo q. Andrea and Polo Foscari q. Urban wrecked in the Bay of Biscay in late 1496 or early 1497: ASVE, SM, reg. 14, fols. 137v-138r. 33  the same year and stopped in Syria at least once. 37 Other vessels combined a voyage to Cyprus with a shorter itinerary, such as Venice-Constantinople. With respect to our findings for the year 1497, there is an evident increase in the number of round ships that sailed to Constantinople. 38 Taking a different stance, one of the significant contributions of geospatial analysis is the identification of anomalous activities. While movement of ships along the established routes is generally predictable (as it largely follows a pattern consistent with Venice's sea laws), irregular movements of anomalous ships are less predictable. In 1514 the Republic was practically unable to police the seas and this, in turn, gave rise to illegal trade. The 500 botti ship captained by Luca Gobo sailed from Constantinople to Ancona carrying merchandise belonging to Anconians, Florentines and Venetians; 39 a barzoto licensed by merchants from Apulia carried salt from Ibiza to Lombardy via the River Po'; the captain of a marciliana was forced to alter his course and stop at Lissa, where he was accused of engaging in illegal traffic between Pesaro and Ragusa. Other vessels completed their cargo in Ancona and in ports "sottovento" (the west coast of the Adriatic Sea). So great was the extent of illegal traffic from the Peloponnese to destinations in the Adriatic Sea that the Senate re-enforced the obligation for all ships to stop first in Corfu. 40 On 18 May, the Senate stressed the prohibition on such practices, with reservation in regard to olive oil, almonds, other nuts and chestnuts shipped to Alexandria, Crete, Beirut, and Venice. A few Dalmatian towns and Cattaro were granted privileges with respect to shipping their local products. The transport of wine from territories "sottovento" to Alexandria was authorized as well. 41 Once again, the presence of sea rovers in the Eastern Mediterranean was alarming. Three French barze and Spaniard corsairs raided colonial-Venetian vessels and ships flying other flags. 42 The evident risk in Syria moved the captain of a big Genoese ship to seek refuge in the port of Famagusta. Vessels that were not suffi- ciently protected were retained in Cyprus for months. The trajectory map (Map. 2) represents the extent of violence at sea, as well as seven notable maritime disasters. 43 Arguably, foreign shipping companies controlled a larger share in the shipping market that connected Venice and the Levant with the western basin of the Mediterranean and Atlantic ports. We found indications of three barze from Biscay, a ship captained by Luca da Lucari da Ragusa, and a vessel captained by Ortunio de Zauri that carried about 3,000 butts of wine from Crete to England and other destinations. 44 Our records do not mention even one Venetian ship that accepted such freights. Apparently, the presence of Venice's ships in Sicily and the Tyrrhenian Sea dwindled too. It is unclear what share of this traffic was still in the hands of the Venetians. We know for certain that a Spaniard and vessels from Puglia received safe conducts to complete their return voyage from Venice to Messina, Lipari, Siena and Trapani. 45

MARITIME CONNECTIONS WITH THE PORT OF CANDIA IN 1514
The wealth of literature on Venetian shipping is not sufficiently linked to documents existing in regional archives. Instead, it relies largely on sources of official character found in the Archives of Venice, in other words, produced by the centre of power. 46 For this reason, the picture that emerges is for the most part consistent with the Republic's protectionist policies in shipping and trade. Namely, Venice as principal port of call for Levantine goods in the Adriatic Sea, the ports of Crete (Candia, Rethymno, Sitia and Chania) as providers for the Republic's shipping interests, and Venetian patricians as protagonists in offering such services. Without dismissing these views entirely, we wish to re-examine government intervention in trade and shipping matters in the overseas territories on the basis of evidence found in regional rather than Venetian records.
The archives of Venetian Crete (now located in Venice) are a rich and valuable source of information on the maritime history of the island, the surrounding region and the Mediterranean in general. The factual basis for the discussion at hand consists of the daily records of the Governor of Candia (Duca di Candia, series "Memoriali"), which contain fragmented official reports. These records are sometimes discontinuous and sometimes in bad condition; gaps in coverage are therefore to be expected. To give an example, the series "Memoriali" lacks information on the year 1497. On the other hand, the two registers covering the year 1514 are in a good state of preservation and include safe conducts inscribed to various vessels that stopped in the port of Candia. The vessels' taxonomy and their next port of call are usually indicated too, and thus the maritime connections with the port of Candia for that year can be largely reconstructed.
Located at a crossroad between the Levantine ports, Constantinople and the western basin of the Mediterranean, the ports and harbours of Crete were important stopping points that connected regional and interregional routes. The island was excessively frequented by local and other merchant fleets. Indeed, our analysis for the year 1514 (Map. 3) shows that Candia was connected by sea with Canea (Chania); towns in the Peloponnese: Coron under Ottoman rule, Monemvasia, Napoli di Romania; and the islands of Stampalia, Skiros, Naxos and Sifnos in the Archipelago by small sailing vessels. Crete was also well connected with Rhodes and Cyprus. As mentioned already, many Greek commercial vessels stopped in Cyprus to load grain in 1514. Quite a few Venetian round ships stopped in Crete on their return voyage from Syria. 47 Venice and Crete were connected all year round by medium-sized vessels -caravelle, gripi and a marano -carrying cheese, wine and other local products. 48 Crete was connected with Constantinople by vessels flying other flags as well. We noted a ship from Lesina, another captained by Giorgio Capodassi, a Ragusan ship named Santa Maria captained by Andrea di Elia di Ragusa, and another captained by Martinum Pastalis. Similarly, a gripeto captained by Calbo Susso sailed from Crete to Syria and then to Constantinople. 49 The fact that the majority of the carriers transporting Cretan wine to England and Flanders were foreign is corroborated by evidence from the local archive. 50 In 1514, Crete was also connected to Messina, Ragusa and other destinations in the Adriatic Sea (the exact ports were not indicated). 51 Our findings also suggest that Ragusan ships increased their activity in the Venetian port system and the Levant at the expense of ships flying the San Marco flag. Clearly, these assertions have to be complemented by scrutiny of the in-between years.

BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS OF THE CORFIOT FLEET IN 1514
The study of the movement patterns of the colonial fleets of small and mediumsized vessels can be considered as one of this project's major contributions. Indeed, as far as the period examined here is concerned, we know very little about the maritime activity of ships operating from ports under Venetian rule. Vessel tracking has the potential to define the regional preference of the various fleets under Venetian rule and to clarify in what way the territorial belonging of a shipping enterprise defined its activity. Questions raised are: To what extent was Corfu connected to a wider sea area by local rather than other ships? Did the fleet of Corfu become more regional over time, while other fleets showed a net increase in the share of other ports?
The following trajectory map (Map. 4) offers a glimpse at such an analysis, by representing the regional preference of the Corfiot fleet for 1514, based on records found in the regional archive of the island. A vessel typed as xylo, of about 63 tons, connected Corfu with Epirus; Saiada (Epirus); Saiada -Dalmatian Coast (Sklavonia); Saiada -Apulia; Apulia (Kastres); Otranto; San Cataldo -Otranto; Dragomestro (Aitoloakarnania) -Venice; Taranto -Prevesa -Calabria; Lessio -Cattaro; Arta; Ambracian Gulf ("kolpos tis Artas"); Cephalonia (quite a few vessels carrying livestock -rams, goats); Katochi (Aitoloakarnania) -Venice; Venice. Smaller vessels of about 31-39 tons connected Corfu with Lepanto, Zante and Venice. Other sources complement this information: a Corfiot caravella carried wine from Parga to Zara; other caravelle sailed to places unspecified in the Adriatic Sea; the gripo of Zacaria da Corfu set sail from Corfu to Alessandria and Cyprus; the Corfiot navilio of Zacaria Megagnani sailed to Rhodes and Damietta. Crosschecking of this information with data extracted for the year 1497 suggests a lack of connection by local vessels to destinations in Sicily (Cao Spartivento, Syracuse), Valona and Constantinople in 1514. 52 In fact, 1514 is a year of transition with respect to Corfiot shipping enterprises. The 18 May ban had significant implications for the local fleet in the following years. Previously, the particular confluence of historical circumstances allowed Corfu's commerce to deviate from the legal strictures imposed by Venice and to grasp the opportunity to promote Ottoman trade in Ancona and at the fairs in Lanciano and Recanati. But in 1514, when the Corfiots requested an exemption from the ban on trade in Lanciano and Recanati, they were denied it by the Venetian Senate. This clipped the wings of Corfu's shipping, which was just beginning "to become autonomous" and was starting to seek out new markets that competed with Venice. The importance the Corfiots attached to their request is demonstrated by the fact that although it was turned down, it was redrafted eight years later, as a proposal to allow one voyage a year to Recanati. Once again, however, the petition was rejected, even though the Corfiots reminded the Senate of the exemption it had granted to their Dalmatian colleagues to trade with regions of the "sottovento". Needless to say, the ban was violated whenever the opportunity arose, and the following years were marked by a more intensive Venetian effort to control the entrepreneurial behaviour of Corfiot merchant-mariners. 53 In this respect, it would be interesting to produce similar trajectory maps for the subsequent years, so as to represent how the maritime connections of the islanders using local fleets changed.

CONCLUSIONS
The adoption of a bottom-up approach and the extraction of data on vessel movements from regional archives, strengthened by both narratives and visualizations, generate a more complex picture of Venice's maritime network than the one usually portrayed in scholarly works. The trajectory maps produced for the years 1497 and 1514 present changing trends along regional and inter-regional sea routes, influenced by both political and economic forces: such as a significant drop in the traffic of round ships to Constantinople two years before the outbreak of the 1499-1502 war, whereas commercial exchange between both capitals was lively in 1514; or the various political and climatic factors that affected the preferred grain outlets; or the Republic's dramatic abandonment of the Atlantic shipping lanes and the taking over of these by foreign shipping companies, etc.
The dramatic reduction in shipping services provided by Venetians in the western basin of the Mediterranean and beyond prompts reflection on the effects of a downturn in shipping on the political, economic and social life in Venice. However, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves first of the historiographical context within which the prediction of Venice's resiliency in the sixteenth century was made.
In the early twentieth century, scholarship ascribed what was then considered to be the decline of Venice and its merchant marine to the great oceanic discoveries and the consequent abandonment of the system of merchant galleys. While Albert H. Lybyer (1915) may deserve pride of place in postponing the decline of the Mediterranean spice trade to a much later period, it was only the work of Frederic C. Lane, first published in 1933, which granted this thesis substantial support through a careful assessment of the Venetian merchant fleet and its capacity over the centuries. 54 Lane stressed that the effects of the Portuguese discoveries on Venetian trade have frequently been misrepresented due to the failure to distinguish between long ships (galleys) and round ships. Historians confused the growth or decline in the size of galley convoys with that of Venetian shipping and the spice trade as a whole. Lane concluded that the decline of merchant galleys was disproportionately related to any decline in Venetian commerce in the first half of the sixteenth century.
Whereas Lane's conviction that the state merchant galleys had been superseded by private merchantmen in liner shipping is substantially correct, our findings sug-53 Ibidem. gests that the round ships too experienced a considerable decline between the last years of the fifteenth century and 1514. Thus, the decline in the system of merchant galleys does seem to reflect a decline in other sectors of shipping.
To the contrary, some trends prove to be resilient, notwithstanding political unrest and imminent danger at sea: for example, more or less regular liner shipping services (galleys and/or round ships) to Syria and Alexandria; or all-yearround traffic between Crete and the ports of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Venice.
We have seen the potential of our methodology to contribute to a discussion on the role of Crete in the wider context of Mediterranean maritime networks. Similarly, study of the behaviour patterns of the Corfiot fleet adds a particular weight to the issue of ships' registry. We have seen too how Venice's subjects coped with an ad-hoc imposition that aimed to jeopardize their ongoing pre-Venetian connections. It remains to be seen in what way the maritime network represented older privileges, even multiple affiliations, in shipping and trade (e.g. with the Sublime Porte). 55 Clearly, it is impossible to draw conclusive conclusions on the changing patterns in Venice's maritime activity in this early stage of the project. First of all, the inbetween years have to be included in our scrutiny. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the ability of our sources to represent a comprehensive picture of shipping is limited. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to extend our research and include records found in other archives. Nevertheless, the preliminary results interact with recent scholarly works that seek to reach a more holistic understanding of Venetian overseas rule, by drawing attention to the mechanics of "brokering" empire against a backdrop of a complex geographical, cultural and traditional substructure. 56 In this perspective, our findings highlight the political-actor role of subalterns in creating spaces of opposition to the conceptions of the hegemonic geo-economic system. 57